Where the Lib Dems Went Wrong

For the Liberal Democrats the general election was the worst in terms of seats won since 1970. No one expected the Lib Dems to be reduced to just eight seats. This article will examine where the Lib Dems went wrong and what could account for such a dreadful result.

Losing Trust

The Liberal Democrats were right to go into Coalition, but we made a few massive mistakes none bigger than the decision over tuition fees. For much of the last few decades the Lib Dems prided themselves on trust. In the 2010 general election hundreds of thousands of young voters voted for the party over its policy to abolish tuition fees. Famously, Nick Clegg and a few other Lib Dem MPs broke their pledges not to increase tuition fees (although 21 Lib Dem MPs kept their pledges). This action to increase tuition fees was seen in the eyes of many young voters as a betrayal. Despite the repeated attempts by Nick Clegg and other Lib Dem ministers to explain the new tuition fees policy, their message was simply ineffective given the loss of trust. More than any other issue tuition fees destroyed the Lib Dem reputation for trust from which the party never recovered during its time in Coalition.

Coalition Conformity and the loss of Identity

The Conservative-Lib Dem Coalition was the first coalition since 1945. Therefore the leadership of the Lib Dems felt an added burden on proving that coalitions could result in stable governments. While no one would doubt that the Coalition was stable, the sense of Coalition conformity that resulted from the commitment to the Coalition ended up in a loss of identity for the party. The Lib Dem identity became almost unrecognisable with both Tory and Lib Dem ministers in every major department. The party also completely failed to successfully differentiate itself from its coalition partners. Although we undoubtedly made the Coalition fairer than it otherwise would have been; ultimately the net result of our efforts was to detoxify the Tory party and toxify our own party.

Demolition of the Local Government base

In electoral terms there was clear evidence that the party strategy was not yielding any reward. From 2011 until 2015 the party lost thousands of councillors. For a party that depends on having a strong local government base in order to win at a parliamentary level, this was a major blow to our ambitions at the general election. Added to this the party suffered massive setbacks in Scotland, Wales, London and in the European Elections. Although our local government base held up relatively well in some part of southern England, in northern England and Scotland it was annihilated. We should have realised much earlier on in 2011 or 2012 that the loss of our local government base was a harbinger of disaster in the general election.

Valueless Centrism

The leadership ditched the party's historic centre-left stance in favour of a committed centrism. Their aim was to try and revive the mythical equidistance of the past. At a time when the party leadership needed to renew its distinctive centre-left values it abandoned them. The strategy of equidistance and centrism was always doomed to fail. How can you be truly equidistance when you're in coalition with a centre-right party and refuse to defend your historic centre-left values? The party has never been truly equidistant, even in the Ashdown years the party was closer to the Labour, shown through the speculation of a Labour-Lib Dem coalition in 1992 and the Blair-Ashdown talks of the mid-1990s. Centrist equidistance was a failed strategy instead we should have outlined a much more distinctive left of centre liberal platform to engage our lost voters and to enable us to much more effectively differentiate us from the Tories.

Defending the Status Quo

People don’t vote for coalitions. I hate to say it but it's true. People vote for political parties. To frame an entire election campaign around forming a future coalition alienated voters from the radicalism of the Lib Dems. The party became the only true defender of the Coalition status quo. Instead of giving people reasons to vote for a future Lib Dem government we were giving voters early compromises on a potential future coalition. No party can both claim to be radical and defend the status quo. This was at a time when other parties were challenging the status quo; the Lib Dems became in the eyes of the public the most uninteresting of the parties. The party's leadership lost touch with its core radicalism and instead became the party of "stability, unity and decency.” The Lib Dems should know more than any other party that there are few votes in defending the status quo especially when you are a third or fourth party.

Learning the Lessons

The party has an uphill battle to regain the trust of the public, especially amongst young people. We should ensure that any future signed party pledges are amongst our election priorities. We failed to do this with tuition fees in 2010 and we paid the price.

In any future coalitions instead of trying to cover all departments we should have ministers in the leading departments and have a department entirely for our ministers to demonstrate Lib Dem policies in action. A good example of such a department would be the Department for Education.

The future leadership of the party should realise that if the current strategy is resulting in massive electoral losses that the party should change it promptly. Equidistant centrism has been a disaster for our party; the party will have to return to its centre-left roots if it is to recover its lost support.

Liberals should never defend the status quo, they should always seek to change it. Losing touch with our core radicalism was the final nail in the coffin of the party's electoral ambitions. The party must learn from its lessons so that in the future the great cause of liberalism can rise again.